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WEIGHING CONSTITUTIONAL ANCHORS:
NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN AND THE




New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' is one of the rare iconic court
decisions nearly all American lawyers recognize and recall. (As a long-
time law professor, I know that recall is even rarer than recognition!)
Although the case no doubt would have been famous in any event, its
prominence was propelled in part by Professor Harry Kalven's celebra-
tion of the decision as embodying the heart and soul of constitutional
2
protection of speech freedom.
Studying First Amendment law under Professor Kalven at the
University of Chicago in the 1970s, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, not
surprisingly, was a pivotal case in my own education about freedom of
speech, constitutional jurisprudence, and the development of legal doc-
trine. Professor Kalven's enthusiasm for the decision was infectious,
spreading to students, colleagues in the professoriate, and First Amend-
ment enthusiasts in the press. Kalven's admiration for New York Times
remains the dominant reaction in law schools and the legal profession.
From the vantage of fifty years' experience, however, Kalven's
excitement should be seen as understandable but short-sighted. This es-
say explains why Professor Kalven was excited by the decision, why it
was so warmly received and so widely embraced as a triumph for the
soul of constitutional governance, and why-despite its virtues-the
New York Times decision was a mistake in constitutional jurisprudence
President, Cass & Associates, PC; Chairman, Center for the Rule of Law;
Dean Emeritus, Boston University School of Law; senior fellow, International Cen-
tre for Economic Research.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, " 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191 (1964).
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that set First Amendment doctrine down a path that threatened to under-
mine the very values Kalven embraced. It is an essay not about Harry
Kalven, but about constitutional values, interpretive virtues, and unin-
tended consequences. In the end, it is a hopeful as well as a cautionary
tale.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STARTING POINTS
When Harry Kalven enthused about the New York Times case,
his starting points were devotion to liberty, appreciation of the threat to
liberty posed by government power to suppress speech, and admiration
for a society governed by a constitution that represented the historic
commitment to the primacy of law over power. His classes on the First
Amendment stressed the importance of freedoms of speech, press, asso-
ciation, and religion as bulwarks of liberty more broadly conceived. Most
insistently, he instructed students that government power to suppress
speech critical of those who govern threatens all liberties of a free, law-
ruled people. The core of the First Amendment in Kalven's vision is the
freedom to say whatever one thinks about the government, its conduct,
and those who occupy the offices of government power.
That was much the same point made in the (no doubt apocry-
phal) story of Ronald Reagan's explanation to Mikhail Gorbachev about
the reason America would prevail over the Soviet Union. Reagan's ex-
planation didn't rest on the provision of better goods and services, a cor-
relation of economic organization with consumer wants much touted as
the basis for restlessness behind the Iron Curtain. Instead, Reagan tied
American exceptionalism and its triumph in the competition among sys-
tems of government to our constitutional values, most of all to our pro-
tection of the freedom of speech. As the story goes, Reagan explained
our commitment to freedom and to the rule of law by telling Gorbachev
that anyone could stand in Lafayette Park, across from the White House,
the quintessential symbol of America's government, and say the vilest
things about the President of the United States-and no one would do a
thing about it because the right to criticize the President was protected by
law. Gorbachev is said to have replied that it was the same in the Soviet
Union: anyone could stand in Red Square across from the Kremlin, the
symbol of Soviet government power, and say the vilest things about the
President of the United States.
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Reagan's point-and Kalven's-was not about the law as writ-
ten but about the law as applied. Any nation can have strong constitu-
tional guarantees, and many of the worst offenders against freedom and
the rule of law have the strongest paper protections of all kinds of rights.
Having real, meaningful protections in practice is much harder,4 and
maintaining them over time, harder yet.
The American Constitution provides powerful safeguards for
liberty largely through structural features that inhibit concentration of
unchecked power in any individual's (or institution's) hands. Those fea-
tures both reflect and encourage popular support for critical limitations
on the sorts of unconstrained discretionary power that have proved dan-
gerous the world over. The Constitution's Framers (some quite reluc-
tantly) agreed to, and the new Congress shortly added to the original
Constitution, a relatively thin set of express protections for court-
enforced rights correlated with particular abuses of power known to the
framing generation-such as quartering troops in private homes, war-
rantless searches, imprisonment of opponents without fair process or
speedy trial.7 But, whether insistent or skeptical of these judicially-
metered protections, the Framers understood the structural protections of
liberty to be more significant, more reliable, and more enduring.8
3. See, e.g., N. KOREA CONSTITUTION art. 67, available at http://wwwl.korea-
np.co.jp/pk/061st issue/98091708.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF FORMER
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS Oct. 7, 1977, art. 50, available at
http://www.constitution.org/cons/ussr77.txt.
4. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Property Rights and the Rule of Law, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO PROPERTY RIGHT ECONOMICS 222, 227-43 (Enrico Colom-
batto, ed., Edward Elgar Pub. 2004) (discussing Zimbabwe's experience in respect
of protections guaranteed property owners).
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison).
6. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 126-93 (Ar-
thur Goldhammer Trans., Library of America Ist ed. 2004) (1835).
7. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 150-61, 447-53, 547-64 (The University of North Carolina Press
1998) (1969).
8. See THE FEDERALSIT No. 51 (James Madison). The combination of govern-
ance structures and popular attitudes have proven remarkably effective in constrain-
ing the worst abuses of government power, supporting fidelity to limitations on per-
sonal power, and particularly at curbing temptations to expand executive power
through means common in many other nations, such as extending time in office,
canceling elections, dissolving the legislature, ignoring judicial commands or per-
401
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Both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights must be seen in this
context as products of an effort to enable good government on matters of
national scope but even more as designs to prevent bad government,
blocking tyranny of the minority and, in some measure, tyranny of the
majority as well.9 The specific protections included in the Bill of Rights,
taken largely from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and from explana-
tions of common-law rights by Coke and Blackstone (sources widely
read by the Framers), focused on specific instances of tyrannical govern-
ance that were of special concern to those who feared increased national
10
power.
The First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause in particular
was directed at a very few potential problems. During the founding era,
the term "freedom of speech" was used in opposition to either the use of
government power to punish statements made in legislative debate (espe-
cially statements critical of the executive) or the use of prior licensing
(also principally statements critical of particular government officials or
policies).1' Proponents of speech and press freedoms often adverted to
common law rights (to jury trials, to process that provides fair notice of
potentially offending behavior, and so on) that offered protection against
sonally intimidating judges. Even where a President's personal power, prestige, or
political future are on the line, the historical record has been one of obeisance to
Constitution and courts. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2001).
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton).
10. See, e.g., Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2000) (De Capo Press
1968) (1788) (hereinafter PAMPHLETS) (authorship attributed to Gerry but later re-
ported to have been written instead by Mercy Otis Warren); ALPHEUS T. MASON,
THE STATES' RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 141-78
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1972) (1964); ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 6-10 (Northeastern University Press 1983) (1955);
WOOD, supra note 7, at 463-99, 536-47.
11. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405,
1443-47 (1987) (hereinafter Perils); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); David
Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Ear-
ly American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985). See also Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977)
(hereinafter Checking Value).
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self-interested and manipulative speech suppression in these contexts or
in related contexts, such as prosecutions for treason.12 The limited dis-
cussion of speech freedom during the debates over the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights primarily revealed concern that similar common-law
protections be extended to the national domain.
This background produces a conundrum for First Amendment in-
terpretation, at least for those of us who see contemporaneously under-
stood meaning of constitutional text as the touchstone for its interpreta-
tion.13 The steps taken in the original Constitution-explicit prohibition
on liability for legislative speech or debate, heightened proof require-
ments for treason convictions, and limitations on ex post facto laws and
bills of attainder-incorporated critical common law safeguards and le-
gal protections against the most feared government abuses of speech reg-
ulation before the Bill of Rights was passed by Congress for submission
to the states.14 While these constitutional provisions did not wholly elim-
inate all concerns of the general sort comprehended by contemporaneous
use of the term "freedom of speech," they certainly reduced the scope for
judicially-enforced federal constitutional speech protection under the
speech clause, and the inclusion of a press clause in the First Amendment
12. See, e.g., Richard H. Lee, Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of
the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention (1787), in PAMPHLETS,
supra note 10, at 277, 316; Rabban, supra note 11; Melanchthon Smith, Address to
the People of the State ofNew York (1787), in PAMPHLETS, supra note 10, at 88-115.
13. This approach, largely associated with Justice Antonin Scalia, see, e.g.,
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
37-47 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (hereinafter MATrER OF INTERPRETATION), turns
out to be widely embraced as a starting point or as a constraint on other interpretive
approaches, and it provides an essential underpinning for any serious interpretation
of constitutional directives as binding sources of law. See, e.g., Checking Value, su-
pra note 11; Perils, supra note 11; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, t 1 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997);
John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 122 HARV. L. REv. 2003 (2009); John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport,
A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383 (2007); Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981); Frederick
Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982); Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Checking Value, supra note I1; Perils, supra note 11; Mayton,
supra note 11; Rabban, supra note 11.
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(presumably to address prior restraint-licensing concerns) occupied much
of what remained in this field.
Whatever is left within the contours of the freedom of speech
clause, then, from the outset of American constitutional speech protec-
tion was uncertain in its detail yet certainly (along with the other Bill of
Rights provisions) connected to fears of self-interested government con-
duct likely to produce harm not readily corrected by mechanisms inde-
pendent of government. This provenance makes it easy to understand
the paucity of cases striking down government actions as contrary to the
freedom of speech clause for the first 150 years of its existence.
II. THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE: HISTORY'S CHAFF, FREEDOM'S CORE
Prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, there was little question
that states (subject to an "incorporated" First Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause) could apply defamation
laws to assess penalties for libel and slander. These laws were ubiquitous
before and at the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted,
and no objection was made to the notion of legal accountability for de-
famatory statements. Further, the Supreme Court had repeatedly declared
that defamatory speech was within the class of communications that lay
outside First Amendment protection, most famously in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.17 Justice Murphy's opinion in Chaplinsky states that
"the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
15. This does not define what is protected against government intrusion but
explains the characteristics of cases that concerned the framing generation and sug-
gests appropriate considerations behind doctrinal choices in free speech jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective
Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1354-81 (1988) (hereinafter Commercial Speech).
16. The sensible approach to analysis of the rights that became enforceable
against state government abridgement by virtue of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment runs through the Privileges or Immunities clause, U.S. Const., amend.
XIV, § 1, cl. 2, not the Due Process clause, U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. That
was not the route taken, so we live with tortured language and an oddly twisted anal-
ysis, but not necessarily an anti-constitutional result. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "mali-
cious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment as applied through
the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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'fighting' words" comprise categories of speech whose "prevention and
punishment .. . have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem."' 9 That statement was repeated by Justice Frankfurter for the Court
in Beauharnais v. Illinois,20 which expanded on the exclusion of libel
from the First Amendment:
Libel of an individual was a common-law crime,
and thus criminal in the colonies. Indeed, at com-
mon law, truth or good motives was no defense. In
the first decades after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, this was changed by judicial decision, statute
or constitution in most States, but nowhere was
there any suggestion that the crime of libel be abol-
ished.2 1
The Court's decision in New York Times, hence, was a marked
departure from precedent. It declared that this class of speech regulations
was not only in tension with the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause
but, at least in respect of one set of libel cases, constituted the core case
of government acts the clause proscribes. Despite historic acceptance of
the government's authority to punish libel, from the founding to shortly
before New York Times, as Beauharnais demonstrates, Justice Brennan's
opinion elaborates reasons that a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct threatens core First Amendment
values. 2 2
In one of his more memorable lines, Brennan said that the con-
troversy over the Sedition Act of 1798 had "crystallized a national
18. Id. at 572.
19. Id. at 571-72.
20. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
21. Id. at 254-55. Truth was accepted as a defense in civil actions for libel be-
fore it was accepted for criminal libel prosecutions, as the latter were predicated not
primarily on a public interest in preventing spread of falsehoods but in public inter-
est in preserving peace and security. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
67-70 (1964). For a different explanation of libel's roots, looking more to personal
interests in reputation than to the public interest in security and conflict-avoidance,
see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986).
22. 376 U.S. 254, 269-83.
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awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment."23 His opinion
cites both contemporaneous critics of the Sedition Act (principally, polit-
ical opponents of the Adams government who perceived the Act as tar-
geted at them) and modem critics (including passing comments in dis-
24
senting opinions in other cases). Certainly, Justice Brennan's assertion
that "the attack upon [the Sedition Act's] validity has carried the day in
the court of history" 25 was a good deal broader and more conclusive than
the evidence merited.26 The opinion is highly selective in its citations and
does not, for instance, note that justices cited as aware of the unconstitu-
tionality of the Adams-era Sedition Act found later, similar legislation to
be constitutional.2 7 If the specific provisions of the 1798 law are regarded
as having overstepped the mark by those who focus on the matter, that is
hardly proof of the broader proposition that all would agree that any legal
restraint on speech that can be analogized to seditious libel is generally
understood to violate the First Amendment.
New York Times is both ahistorical in its treatment of libel as if it
were of questionable constitutionality from early in the nation's history
and a bit disingenuous in its exposition. Putting aside the decision's leap
over non-constitutional grounds for setting aside the judgment (such as
the difficulty of reading the advertisement at issue as actually referring to
and disparaging Commissioner Sullivan personally, a matter the Court
gets to after revising the constitutional grounds for assessing libel law28 ),
the opinion weaves bits and pieces of precedent, public commentary, and
academic analysis together in a way that is tailored to reach a conclusion
rather than to reflect more honest evaluation of the state of the law.
23. Id. at 273.
24. Id. at 274-76.
25. Id. at 276.
26. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (Belknap Press 1960); Mayton,
supra note 11. While the reference in New York Times broadly follows the account
given in ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (Harvard Univ.
Press 1941), the fuller historical record casts doubt on the facile assertion that sedi-
tious libel was the focus of free speech concerns at the framing and was proscribed
by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Perils, supra note 11, at 1460.
27. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (opinion for a
unanimous Court by Justice Holmes, joined by, among others, Justice Brandeis).
28. 376 U.S. at 288-92.
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Despite these criticisms, the decision does underscore a critical
concern animating the First Amendment. Brennan's basic contention re-
garding the Sedition Act is that prosecution for seditious libel can pro-
vide an avenue for government officials to suppress public comment by
citizens when the best understanding of the Constitution and the First
Amendment is that the citizenry retains the right to discuss the operation
of government, to criticize the performance of public officials, and use
such discussion and criticism to control the selection and behavior of the
individuals who (temporarily) are entrusted with public office. His opin-
ion connects that point to the existence of qualified immunity from liabil-
ity for officials who make statements, even defamatory statements, with-
in the course of their official duties, asserting that the citizenry should be
on equal footing with respect to statements disparaging officials, limiting
the immunity to statements that are not malicious, based on knowledge
of falsity.29 Brennan also rightly notes that this connection is bolstered by
cases striking down other government actions punishing critical com-
ment about officials' conduct, such as the use of contempt authority to
punish public criticism of (or disrespect to) the judge wielding the con-
tempt power.30
New York Times' pronouncement that the First Amendment at its
core protects against the risk of self-interested suppression of speech by
government officials-most of all speech that concerns official conduct,
that has potential significant public benefit, and that is unlikely to be
provided as readily if subject to liability"-is the aspect of the decision
that so excited Professor Kalven.32 And it is right.33 Whether a particular
29. Id. at 281-82.
30. 376 U.S. at 272-73 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941));
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
31. For an explanation of the importance of these variables, see Commercial
Speech, supra note 15.
32. See Kalven, supra note 2.
33. See, e.g., Checking Value, supra note 11; Vincent Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985); Lillian R.
BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978) (hereinafter Political Speech);
Perils, supra note 11; Commercial Speech, supra note 15; Frederick Schauer, Cate-
gories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981)
(hereinafter Categories). See also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
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restraint is included within the speech clause's ambit or not is a separate
question from identifying the principle that best explains the clause, but
Justice Brennan's opinion makes a contribution by drawing together a
fair number of prior cases into a coherent explanation of the central pur-
pose of the clause and, in substantial measure, the First Amendment
overall.34
Kalven's article extends and sharpens the theoretical analysis,
placing the considerations at the center of the decision in a context that
fits with the structural provisions in the Constitution. Kalven recognizes
that judges are government officials and that structural elements such as
separation of powers among government authorities will not always be
enough to protect core liberty interests. 35 Those charged with restraining
other official actors may have their own reasons for failing to do so, for
bending the law, or for erroneous application of existing rules.
The New York Times case itself is illustrative. The Alabama ju-
dicial system found that the Times advertisement referred to Commis-
sioner Sullivan, though it did not mention him, his position, or the entity
he worked for, and most of the actions criticized had no connection to
him; the judges and jury stretched to reach decisions adverse to defend-
ants in a racially-charged atmosphere, essentially using libel law to pun-
ish disfavored critics of the government's response to protests, as the
Court's opinion makes plain (albeit as coda to its revision of constitu-
tional law rather than as a means for decision on non-constitutional
grounds).36
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
413 (1996).
34. See Kalven, supra note 2; see also 376 U.S. at 269-70.
35. See Kalven, supra note 2.
36. 376 U.S. at 288-92. It is far from clear whether the defendants were labor-
ing under a special burden because they were at odds with the governing authorities,
with entrenched social norms, or because their identity (minorities and a news organ-
ization from New York) independently marked them as "outsiders." Any of these
explanations placed them in a category that created greater risk of having expression
suppressed for reasons in tension with the principles enunciated in New York Times.
For a broad exposition of, inter alia, the First Amendment's special concern for dis-
sent and dissenters, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (Princeton Univ. Press 1999); but see Lawrence B. Solum,
The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 859 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999) (exploring
difficulties of utilizing that concern in crafting First Amendment doctrine)).
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Kalven's conception would have the First Amendment function
as an insurance policy, an extra safeguard against self-interested suppres-
sion of criticism where there are special risks that the established struc-
tures of democratic government will not to curb abuse of government
power, whether through misapplication of legal rules or otherwise.37 That
is not just a defensible reason for the Amendment; it is an accurate rendi-
tion of the animating principle in its adoption. And the application of that
principle to assessment of penalties for criticism of government policies
and officials' conduct in office focuses on the central case for concern.
III. NEW YORK TIMES' LEGACY: LOOSED MOORINGS, BAD LAW
Although Justice Brennan's identification of core concerns about
government speech suppression is laudable (and Professor Kalven's re-
capitulation of the concerns even more clearly articulates the basis for
core First Amendment protections), the New York Times decision has had
two sorts of unfortunate effects on the law.
First, the Court adopted a rule that, by shifting the inquiry to the
intentions of those whose statements defame public officials and requir-
ing "actual malice" in the form of knowledge that the defamatory state-
ments were false, generated several practical problems. It has (paradoxi-
cally) encouraged some classes of plaintiffs to file suit because of the
difficulty of succeeding, has inflated the damages awarded when plain-
tiffs do succeed, has increased litigation costs, and has at least along
some margins reduced incentives for accurate reporting.38 These are seri-
ous problems. Yet, in order to get a true picture of the decision's practi-
cal impact, the costs associated with these problems must be balanced
against the benefits of sturdier insulation against socially wasteful recov-
eries and reduced inhibitions on some useful speech critical of public of-
37. See Kalven, supra note 2.
38. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 487 (1991); Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law After New
York Times: An Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 69 (1989) (hereinafter Incentive Analysis); Richard A. Epstein, Was
New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 782 (1986); William P.
Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Jour-
nalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169 (1994). See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING
THE PRESS (Oxford Univ. Press 1986).
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ficials. I have written before about some of the practical effects of New
York Times; they are not, however, the focus of this essay.
A. Casting Off Principle Abstractedfrom Precedent
The other class of unfortunate effects from the New York Times
decision concerns legal doctrine. The decision's strength in First
Amendment theory was matched by its weakness in judicial decision-
making, particularly its infidelity to decisional constraints evidenced in
Brennan's casting off the lines of historical understanding of the
Amendment's meaning. With long-accepted laws in areas consistently
excepted from the Amendment's reach now in play, changes in the law
almost certainly would not stop with the Times decision-and did not.
New York Times encouraged theorizing about what the Amendment
meant by reference to principle extracted from precedent; that exercise
proved rather more liberating than reliance on historically accepted un-
derstanding (admittedly not a cast iron constraint, but still one with more
drag than reasoning from abstract principle).
Almost immediately things started going off-track. In a series of
cases on privacy and defamation, the Court showed its preference for
free-form balancing of considerations such as the plaintiffs ability to
gain access to public communications media to disseminate his or her
views, the significance of the individual in shaping events of importance
to the public, or the interest of the public in the plaintiffs life, actions,
and views.40 At first, the Court only took baby steps away from its New
York Times reasoning. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,41 for instance, the Court
expanded the limitations of New York Times by restricting constitutional-
ly permissible inferences about whether comments actually referred to a
particular individual and announcing that who qualified as a "public offi-
cial" would be determined by reference to the principles underlying the
41
Speech and Press Clauses. In concluding that a supervisor of a county-
owned recreation area hired by the county commissioners could be a
public official covered by the New York Times rule, the justices tied their
39. See Incentive Analysis, supra note 38.
40. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
41. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
42. Id. at 79-86.
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reasoning back to observations about the centrality of preventing sup-
pression of criticism of current holders of government power:
Criticism of government is at the very center of the
constitutionally protected area of free discussion.
Criticism of those responsible for government op-
erations must be free, lest criticism of government
itself be penalized. It is clear, therefore, that the
"public official" designation applies at the very
least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over
the conduct of governmental affairs.43
Not long after, however, the justices moved more boldly away
from that limiting focus. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 44 the majority
agreed that the New York Times case's formula prescribing limits on libel
judgments against public officials should apply as well to judgments
against "public figures."45 Chief Justice Warren explained:
[A]lthough they are not subject to the restraints of
the political process, "public figures," like "public
officials," often play an influential role in ordering
society. And surely as a class these "public figures"
have as ready access as "public officials" to mass
media of communication, both to influence policy
and to counter criticism of their views and activi-
ties. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial
interest in the conduct of such persons, and free-
dom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events
is as crucial as it is in the case of "public officials."
43. 383 U.S. at 85 (citation omitted).
44. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
45. See id. at 162-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 170-72 (Black & Doug-
las, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 172 (Brennan & White, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The fact that they are not amenable to the restraints
of the political process only underscores the legiti-
mate and substantial nature of the interest, since it
means that public opinion may be the only instru-
ment by which society can attempt to influence
their conduct.4 6
The recognition of the Court's New York Times decision that
penalties for criticism of the government constituted the special evil that
concerned the framing generation was replaced in the Chief Justice's
opinion with the observation that "[i]ncreasingly in this country, the dis-
tinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred" because
of the "high degree of interaction between the intellectual, governmental,
and business worlds" since World War II.47 Those views were adopted as
well by Justices Brennan, White, Black, and Douglas. Justices Black and
Douglas, however, had a broader reason why the differentiation of public
officials from public figures was of no moment: abstracting heroically
from the actual concerns of those who wrote and ratified the First
Amendment and from the contemporary understanding of its import, Jus-
tices Black and Douglas concluded that "the First Amendment was in-
tended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel judgments"
regardless of the identity of the plaintiff, the truth of the libelous state-
48
ment, or the subject the statement concerns.
Similar reasoning led the Court to find that the First Amendment
also limits suits by purely private individuals-those who are neither
49
public officials nor public figures-in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.50 Writing for the plurality in Rosen-
bloom, Justice Brennan observed that, although the constitutional con-
straints identified in New York Times were "in the context of defamatory
falsehoods about the official conduct of a public official, later decisions
have disclosed the artificiality, in terms of the public's interest, of a sim-
ple distinction between 'public' and 'private' individuals or institutions .
46. 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
47. Id. 163.
48. Id. 172 (Black. & Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
50. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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... " For Brennan now, the First Amendment limited libel recoveries in
any case "involving matters of public or general concern, without regard
to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous"-and decid-
edly without regard to whether they hold public office. 5 2
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz, declared that, at
least for speakers classified as part of "the communications media,"53 a
different rule must apply. Public officials and public figures, Powell
says, both have more opportunity to rebut libels and less desert for sym-
pathy on being the victims of libel, given the likelihood that they have
voluntarily thrust themselves into positions where they exercise substan-
tial power (of some sort) or seek to influence public affairs (in some
54way). The Gertz majority concluded that "the press and broadcast me-
dia" should not face strict liability for any defamation, even defamatory
statements not deemed to involve "an issue of public or general inter-
est[,]" but that in setting bounds for defamation recoveries by private
figures states are free to depart from the New York Times rule. The
opinion purports to balance competing public interests in protecting the
undefined class of writers and speakers comprising "the communications
media," on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in safeguarding the
good names and reputations of individuals who have not succeeded in
endeavors that bring fame or fortune, nor sought public office, nor en-
gaged in conduct that makes it likely they intended to influence im-
portant public matters.6 The categories of speakers and subjects of
speech that the decision comprehends may be imprecisely defined, but
51. 403 U.S. at 41.
52. Id. at 44.
53. 418 U.S. at 345.
54. Id at 344-46.
55. Id. at 346-48.
56. Id. at 344-48. The opinion does not hide its method of arriving at a conclu-
sion, speaking of the need to identify the right balance "between the need for a vig-
orous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful inj u-
ry," 418 U.S. at 342, or the "balance between the needs of the press and the
individual's claim for compensation for wrongful injury," 418 U.S. at 343; the deci-
sion speaks of "[o]ur accommodation of the competing values at stake in defamation
suits by private individuals," 418 U.S. at 348, declares that the Court's "approach
provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved
here[,]", 418 U.S. at 347-48, and explains "here we are attempting to reconcile state
law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First
Amendment[,]"418 U.S. at 349.
413
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
the constitutional grounds for the Court's balancing are far more difficult
to divine.
B. Sailing with the Wind: Free Speech and Campaign Finance
Having encouraged decision-making not by fitting within estab-
lished precedent and textual command as closely as possible but by rea-
soning from the principles found within what the justices now saw as the
right understanding of the relevant clause's legal purpose, the Court's
decisions following New York Times ceded the ground claimed in that
case for the core of First Amendment jurisprudence. The New York
Times case's insight that criticism of government and government offi-
cials "is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free
discussion"5 suggests special skepticism about government restrictions
aimed at speech related to officials' performance in office and, what is
virtually inseparable, selection of officials to hold public office.59 To be
sure, the justices have not abandoned concern about governmental bur-
dens on speech critical of government. 60 However, majorities have em-
braced the notion that government regulation of conduct intertwined
with, supporting, and funding speech critical of government-regulation
that places special burdens on that speech in the election context, includ-
ing in contests to replace incumbents because of their conduct in of-
fice-could be acceptable if the regulation reflects good motives and
57. See, e.g., id. at 369-404 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent
makes that point sharply, noting that "[s]cant, if any, evidence exists that the First
Amendment was intended to abolish the common law of libel," id. at 381, and that
"the Court apparently finds a clean slate where in fact we have instructive historical
experience[,]" id. at 387.
58. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
59. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1045 (1985); Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 34
(1971).
60. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Eu v.
San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 219 (1989); Fed-
eral Elec. Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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does not go too far, a reflection of the move from precedent to balanc-
- 61ing.
The Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo62 is exemplary.
The Buckley decision, while striking down limitations on certain elec-
tion-related expenditures, upheld restrictions on contributions used to fi-
nance speech in election campaigns on the view that such restraints did
not amount to a limitation on speech or that the government's interest in
avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption outweighed the in-
terference with speech.63 In subsequent cases, the justices have balanced
these "corruption" concerns (fears of conduct that disrupts acceptable po-
litical process and fears that perceived corruption could harm democratic
governance by discouraging participation, among other things) against
the degree of interference they find with protected speech.6 The "corrup-
tion" that justifies speech restriction has not been clearly articulated by
the justices who are persuaded by this argument,65 and the balance be-
61. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Elec. Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Feder-
al Elec. Comm'n v. Colorado Repub. Fed. Campaign Comm., 553 U.S. 431 (2001);
McConnell v. Federal Elec. Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citi-
zens United v. Federal Elec. Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Of course, the ambit of
the regulation of speech and of expenditures that primarily facilitate speech in the
election context is not limited to speech critical of government or of current govern-
ment officials, and the reasons for the regulation are not confined to concerns about
the criticism of such officials. But a good deal of the impact of the regulation con-
cerns restrictions on speech that is critical of government officials; the regulations
have the capacity and, in all likelihood to at least some extent, the design to ad-
vantage current officials and to disadvantage opponents who also are apt to be criti-
cal of those officials. See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 66-70 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (discussing in-
cumbent protection aspect of campaign finance regulation).
62. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
63. Id. at 23-38.
64. See, e.g., Federal Elec. Comm'n v. Nat'l Conserv. Polit. Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Elec. Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);
Colorado Repub. Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elec. Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604
(1996); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Federal
Elec. Comm'n v. Colorado Repub. Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001);
McConnell v. Federal Elec. Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
65. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Money, Power, and Politics: Governance Mod-
els and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
Governance Models] (explaining the different possible models of government that
tween speech and other concerns is sufficiently unstructured to allow
66
considerable variation from justice to justice and case to case. Judge
Frank Easterbrook complained of the lack of guidance these cases pro-
vide to lower courts (among others), rightly suggesting that there are
plenty of campaign finance cases that might find "five Justices [who]
will go along" with outcomes boldly inconsistent with established prin-
67
ciples of constitutional law. The Supreme Court's decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, upholding an array of ex-
plicit and far-reaching restrictions on speech about candidates for elec-
tion to federal office, may be the best evidence for Judge Easterbrook's
complaint.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,70 the Court
(at least temporarily) took a different turn, as a majority of the Court
struck down a prohibition on use of funds for "electioneering" speech by
corporations or unions-speech referring to a clearly identified candi-
date, promoting election or defeat, made within 30 days of an election.7 1
The prohibition mostly affected speech by small corporations and non-
profit enterprises; although in theory the prohibition swept more broadly,
larger profit-seeking corporations tend to be politically risk-averse for
fear of offending potential customers.72 Despite condemnation by an ar-
ray of politicians, pundits, and professors, the Court's decision has at its
core the same understanding that animated the New York Times Court:
that government action is most suspect, and cuts most directly against
might inform the justices' decisions and the interplay between those models and no-
tions of "corruption," which seems for many justices to encompass a great deal of
conduct that advantages outcomes preferred by one or another sort of group but does
not readily fit core conceptions of "corruption").
66. Compare, e.g., Colorado Repub. Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elec.
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), with Federal Elec. Comm'n v. Colorado Repub. Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
67. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 358 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.,
dubitante).
68. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
69. See id.
70. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Vicki Kemper & Deborah Lutterbeck, The Country Club, 22
COMMON CAUSE MAG., MAR. 22, 1996, at 16, available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/msx56bOO/pdfjsessionid=9412CBB76BB0659D28
FD9FE34121264F.tobacco04.
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First Amendment commands, when it favors or disfavors speakers or
messages related to the performance or selection of government offi-
cials. Those are the regulations that are most likely to be self-interested,
least likely to advance public interests in ways divorced from officials'
personal gain, and most apt to unduly discourage speech of public val-
ue.74 In this sense, Citizens United should be lauded as a return to the
values that Harry Kalven celebrated in New York Times as well as to a
mode of interpretation more likely to provide a firmer anchor for protect-
ing against risky government interference with speech.
Critics of Citizens United-a large and very vocal crowd-were
aghast that the Court would invalidate legal provisions intended to re-
duce the potential influence of corporations and unions (especially cor-
porations) on elections.75 The critics, including the dissenting justices,
insisted that in the balance of social concerns, fears of corporate domi-
73. See 558 U.S. at 339-41, 371-72.
74. See, e.g., Cass, Governance Models, supra note 65, at 56-57. See also
Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 11; Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Re-
straint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 54-63 (1981); BeVier, Political
Speech, supra note 33; Cass, Commercial Speech, supra note 15, at 1368-73; Kal-
ven, supra note 2; Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1989). Related concerns respecting the self-interest of promoters of
legislation restricting campaign finance and expenditure and the implementation of
campaign finance regulations are found in Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Re-
form's War on Political Freedom, CITY J., Jul. 1, 2007, available at http://www.city-
journal.org/html/ws2007-07-01bs.html.
75. See, e.g., Eugene J. Dionne, Jr., The Citizens United Catastrophe, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
citizens-united-catastrophe/2012/02/05/gIQATOEfsQstory.html; Ronald Dworkin,
The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, MAY 13, 2010, at 8,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-
threatens-democracy/?pagination=false; Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Lawrence Norden, How to Put
US Voters Back in Charge of Their Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, Jan. 21,
2014, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/
2014/012 1/How-to-put-US-voters-back-in-charge-of-their-democracy; Jamie
Raskin, "Citizens United " and the Corporate Court, THE NATION, Oct. 8, 2012,
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/169915/citizens-united-and-corporate-
court#.
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nance of election discourse were more serious and better grounded than
76
fears of official use of the laws to suppress critical speech.
Yet that criticism, built on a framework of assumptions about
how to balance speech interests against other interests, misapprehends
what the First Amendment does. True enough, the Amendment has never
been understood to constitute a blanket proscription against regulation of
speech, even of speech expressing opposition to government, in all forms
and at all costs-notwithstanding absolutist assertions of scholars such as
77
Alexander Meiklejohn and judges such as Justice Hugo Black. Even so,
the protection afforded by the First Amendment at its core cannot be sub-
ject to the sort of case-by-case balancing of interests that is suggested by
advocates of campaign finance reform.
Under any approach to interpretation of the First Amendment,
other interests can overwhelm concerns about unwise suppression of
speech in particular instances, even speech that is related to govern-
ment's operation. So, for example, prohibitions on disclosure of troops'
movements and locations in war-time are universally acknowledged as
legitimate limitations on speech. But the legitimacy of this sort of gov-
ernment control is not based on a relatively free-form balancing of inter-
76. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394-95, 469-75 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.);
Hasen, supra note 75; James Kwak, Citizens United v. FEC Turns 2-And It's Still
Wrong, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 20, 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com
/business/archive/2012/01 /citizens-united-v-fec-tums-2-and-its-still-wrong/25 1706/.
See also President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 156 CONG. REC.
H414, Jan. 27, 2010 ("[T]he Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests-including foreign corporations-to
spend without limit in our elections. I don't think American elections should be
bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. They
should be decided by the American people.").
77. For a statement of the absolutist position, see Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961) (a position that re-
quires contortions to save speech by the for-profit news media even as it leaves un-
protected speech integrally related to political decision-making when communicated
by individuals, such as lobbyists, paid to make the case for others); see also Edmund
Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962) ("[The First Amendment] says 'no law', and that is what
I believe it means.").
78. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U.
PA. L. REv. 975, 979 (1968); GEOFFREY STONE, FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (W.W. Norton 2004).
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ests. It is grounded in appreciation that the category of speech consisting
of public revelation of factual information whose secrecy is essential to
national security is outside the ambit of expression protected by the First
Amendment; disclosure of information that puts lives of our soldiers at
risk does not appreciably advance discourse about governance nor call
government officials to account, and while secrecy can be inimical to
public accountability, fears about protection of such sensitive factual in-
formation played no role in the framing of the Free Speech Clause and
disclosure of this sort of information decidedly was not understood at the
time to fall within the Speech Clause's terms.
That approach, resting on the understanding of the clause's
meaning and the categories of speech restraints proscribed, is both more
likely to provide clear bounds around the range of government actions
that are permitted and around the speech that is protected. Some schol-
ars and judges have relied on forms of "categorical balancing" that are
not radically different from approaches based on the historical under-
standing of the Amendment's scope to identify protected categories; but
balancing in general, and case-by-case balancing in particular, provides
less secure safeguards against the sorts of impositions that the Amend-
ment was intended to preclude.8' When freedom from self-interested
suppression of speech that is potentially threatening to government offi-
cials turns on how a majority of judges weighs the interests that go into
79. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 78, at 979-80 (arriving at this conclusion,
however, through the redefinition of the disclosure as "action" rather than "expres-
sion").
80. See, e.g., Schauer, Categories, supra note 33; SCALIA, MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 37-47. While the approach generally requires
some abstraction from the narrow set of situations whose treatment under the text
was understood at the time of the rule's adoption, categorization within the structure
of the rule's initial understanding tends to be more constraining-to admit to a nar-
rower range of potential outcomes-than most alternatives, especially ad hoc bal-
ancing.
81. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Bal-
ancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987); John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analy-
sis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Priva-
cy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role
of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711 (1994);
Schauer, Categories, supra note 33.
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the balance neither consistency nor strong protections of speech should
be expected. The campaign finance cases from Buckley through
McConnell right up to Citizens United (and perhaps beyond) certainly fit
that prediction.
CONCLUSION
For a case that prompted so much adulation and excitement at
the time it was announced-and that still is much admired by professors,
reporters, and commentators-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has been
far from the successful turning point in the law its champions expected.
While it aptly captured a truth about the fears and hopes that led to adop-
tion of the First Amendment, pinpointing the special risks associated
with suppression of speech critical of government and government offi-
cials, the decision rested on the soft ground of balancing and abstraction
rather than the firmer (though far from rock-solid) soil of history, accept-
ed textual understanding, and precedent. What followed this change in
interpretive method fit well Lord Macaulay's prediction that the Ameri-
can Constitution would turn out to be "all sail and no anchor." 8 2
The move to a less constrained mode of constitutional interpreta-
tion led quickly to a series of decisions that moved away from seeing the
First Amendment in terms of what New York Times so eloquently de-
scribed as the heart and soul of free speech concerns, the "central mean-
ing" that Professor Kalven exalted. The Court's evolving balance of con-
siderations erred in leading it to strike down whole bodies of law long
accepted as consistent with First Amendment concerns-accepted as
such before the First Amendment's adoption, at the time of its assimila-
tion into the Constitution, and for almost 175 years after that as well.
Much more troublesome, balancing different values allowed the
Court to approve restrictions of political speech and of conduct integrally
connected to and supporting such speech in exactly the settings that
82. Letter from Lord Thomas B. Macaulay to Henry S. Randall (May 23,
1857), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1 860/03/24/news/macaulay-democracy-
curious-letter-lord-macaulay-american-institutions-prospects.html. Lord Macaulay
feared that increasing democratization of the American republic would lead eventu-
ally to the destruction of liberty and a fall of America akin to the fall of Rome to the
barbarians. Id. The Macaulay quote is a favorite of my former colleague and long-
time friend Glen Robinson, who brought it to my attention too many years ago.
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should be seen as most likely to produce government action serving offi-
cials' self-interest and reducing speech that serves public interests by
bringing criticisms of government to light. The threat to speech at issue
in the campaign finance cases fits the paradigm of core First Amendment
concerns far more readily than the class of speech that prompted Justice
Brennan's flight of rhetorical fancy in New York Times. Campaign fi-
nance laws regulate speech that informs the public about official behav-
ior in the context of election contests, the most powerful and immediate
way of policing public officials, while libel laws target speech that is
likely to be false as well as harmful to particular individuals.
Conceptions of the First Amendment that support, inform or ex-
plain these decisions are at odds with the understanding of what the
Amendment meant when adopted and for generations after that, and the
method of deciding whether government conduct is permitted or prohib-
ited leaves the core of constitutionally protected speech at risk. It remains
to be seen whether Citizens United signals a victory for the more tradi-
tional, and traditionally grounded, vision of the First Amendment and a
more predictable demarcation of the limits of speech regulation for the
future or, instead, a temporary, short-lived triumph for that vision before
it returns to the sidelines. Maybe-just maybe-renewed attention to the
central concerns highlighted in New York Times and to what went wrong
following New York Times will provide both inspiration and caution to
those who interpret and who write about the Constitution. Should we
meet again for the 75th anniversary of the Times case to see?
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